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BIGOTRY, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND LGBTQ CHILD
WELFARE
Jordan Blair Woods*
WHO’S THE BIGOT? LEARNING FROM CONFLICTS OVER MARRIAGE
AND CIVIL RIGHTS LAW. By Linda C. McClain. New York: Oxford
University Press. 2020. Pp. 230. $39.95.
INTRODUCTION
On November 12, 2020, Justice Samuel Alito delivered a keynote address
at the Federalist Society’s annual convention 1 that caught the attention of national media. 2 Justice Alito warned that individual liberty was in danger. 3 His
remarks covered several topics, including COVID-19 and religious liberty,
freedom of speech, the Second Amendment, and conflicts between religious
liberty and same-sex marriage, 4 with notable mention of the Court’s recent

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas School of Law. I am grateful for
the helpful comments from Meghan Boone, Lisa Martin, and participants in the 2020 Child Law
& Rights Writers’ Workshop. I am thankful for the valuable research assistance from Martin
Arroyo. Finally, thank you to Brooke Simone, Aditya Vedapudi, and the editors of the Michigan
Law Review for valuable suggestions and edits.
1. Justice Samuel Alito, Address at the 2020 FEDERALIST SOC. National Lawyers Convention, (Nov. 12, 2020), https://fedsoc.org/conferences/2020-national-lawyers-convention#agendaitem-address-8.
2. See Robert Barnes, Justice Alito Says Pandemic Has Resulted in ‘Unimaginable’ Restrictions on Individual Liberty, WASH. POST (Nov. 12, 2020, 10:51 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/11/12/samuel-alito-federalist-society-speech [perma.cc/J85Z-YDX3];
Jess Bravin, Justice Alito Responds to Liberal Critics, Says Covid-19 Is ‘Constitutional Stress Test,’
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 13, 2020, 10:35 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-alito-responds-toliberal-critics-says-covid-19-is-constitutional-stress-test-11605244977 [perma.cc/KNR4-YEAP];
Adam Liptak, In Unusually Political Speech, Alito Says Liberals Pose Threat to Liberties, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/13/us/samuel-alito-religious-libertyfree-speech.html [perma.cc/9UBK-J29D]; Ariane de Vogue, Alito Raises Religious Liberty Concerns About Covid Restrictions and Same-Sex Marriage Ruling, CNN (Nov. 13, 2020, 10:18 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/12/politics/samuel-alito-religious-freedom-federalist-society/index.html [perma.cc/B5K9-29KA].
3. For a transcript of Justice Alito’s remarks at the 2020 Federalist Society National Lawyers Convention, see Josh Blackman, Video and Transcript of Justice Alito’s Keynote Address to
the Federalist Society, REASON: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 12, 2020, 11:18 PM), https://reason.com/volokh/2020/11/12/video-and-transcript-of-justice-alitos-keynote-address-to-the-federalist-society [perma.cc/JRT4-YPBV].
4. Id.
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decisions in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission 5 and
Obergefell v. Hodges. 6
In his comments on religion and same-sex marriage, Justice Alito emphasized the value of tolerance and rejected charges of bigotry. For instance, in
discussing Masterpiece Cakeshop, Justice Alito stressed, “For many today, religious liberty is not a cherished freedom. It’s often just an excuse for bigotry,
and it can’t be tolerated, even when there is no evidence that anybody has been
harmed.” 7 He continued, “The question we face is whether our society will be
inclusive enough to tolerate people with unpopular religious beliefs.”8 Discussing Obergefell, Justice Alito stated, “You can’t say that marriage is the union between one man and one woman. Until very recently, that’s what the vast
majority of Americans thought. Now it’s considered bigotry.” 9
The timing of Justice Alito’s keynote address is noteworthy. It was delivered the week after Election Day, the same week that Justice Amy Coney Barrett took part in her first oral argument after joining the high court. 10 It was
also one week after the Court heard oral arguments in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, in which a faith-based child placement agency that refuses to license
same-sex couples as foster parents challenged the city’s refusal to renew the
agency’s contract. 11 In the leadup to the Fulton decision, scholars and commentators warned that the case could have major consequences for the balance between religious liberty claims and antidiscrimination protections for
LGBTQ people. 12 Although the Court in Fulton ultimately ruled against the
5. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
6. 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
7. Blackman, supra note 3.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See Jessica Gresko, Newly Confirmed Supreme Court Justice Amy Coney Barrett to
Hear Arguments for the First Time, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 2, 2020, 1:02 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/nation-world/ct-nw-amy-coney-barrett-supreme-court-20201102-wkdhgripmjdmvojijrxt5sttny-story.html [perma.cc/B8W6-68SN].
11. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021) (No. 19-123).
12. See, e.g., Julie Moreau, Supreme Court Adoption Case Could Have Broad Nondiscrimination Impact, NBC NEWS (Mar. 4, 2020, 6:56 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/
supreme-court-adoption-case-could-have-broad-nondiscrimination-impact-n1150041 [perma.
cc/PH7T-6Q38] (“[L]egal experts say the case could have a significant impact on not just parental
rights but also nondiscrimination protections more broadly.”); MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT
PROJECT, THE HIGH STAKES IN THE FULTON CASE (2020), https://www.lgbtmap.org/file/2020fulton-report.pdf [perma.cc/QDA8-YX2G] (“The stakes for the children and families who are
involved in the child welfare system could not be higher.”); Daniel Summers, Discrimination Is
Never in Kids’ Best Interest, SLATE (Mar. 5, 2020, 3:54 PM), https://slate.com/human-interest/2020/03/supreme-court-foster-care-fulton-philadelphia.html [perma.cc/2AE9-7P9E] (“The
broad implications of the case, should the conservative majority side with Catholic Social Services, could be disastrous for antidiscrimination laws writ large.”). In January 2022, the Family
Court Review published a collection of articles and essays authored by scholars on the Fulton
case, including its implications for the balance between religious liberty claims and antidiscrimination protections on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. See 60 Fam. Ct. Rev.
1 (2022).

April 2022]

Bigotry, Civil Rights, and LGBTQ Child Welfare

1013

city on narrower grounds, 13 the trajectory of the case offers important lessons
for the future.
Professor Linda McClain’s14 excellent new book, Who’s the Bigot? Learning from Conflicts over Marriage and Civil Rights Law, provides valuable insight into the use of the rhetoric of bigotry in conflicts over marriage and civil
rights law, like those in Justice Alito’s remarks. The heart of the book ambitiously traces how people understood and discussed bigotry in various struggles over marriage and civil rights dating back to the mid-twentieth century,
including interfaith marriage, segregation and integration, the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, antimiscegenation laws, and the Court’s evolving approach to
constitutional rights for lesbians and gays, including same-sex marriage.
McClain’s analysis draws on a wide range of sources, including congressional
debates and testimony, judicial opinions, arguments made by advocates and
litigants, social science literature, and newspapers, magazines, and other media
(p. 13). Her analysis reveals recurring patterns in arguments regarding marriage and civil rights, including appeals to conscience and sincere beliefs
meant to rebut charges of bigotry (p. 5). The book offers meaningful lessons
about the rhetoric of bigotry and its puzzles for civil rights struggles, especially
in this uniquely polarized period in United States history. 15 Overall, McClain’s
book makes an original contribution to our understanding of bigotry, especially in struggles at the intersection of family law and civil rights.
In this Review, I aim to highlight the strengths of Professor McClain’s rich
and insightful book while also calling attention to the ways in which McClain’s
framework helps us understand the pattern of arguments in Fulton, the latest
conflict over marriage and the scope of civil rights before the Supreme Court.
Fulton provides a fresh lens through which to view McClain’s arguments, the
book’s publication having preceded the Court’s grant of certiorari in Fulton
by one week. 16 McClain’s unique perspective also has much to offer in enhancing our understanding of LGBTQ child welfare issues as civil rights struggles.
Although the child welfare system has long been the target of full-throated
critiques, 17 problems in child welfare have not been historically framed as civil

13. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1877, 1882 (explaining the Court’s decision not to revisit ruling
in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).
14. Robert Kent Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.
15. See ch. 9; Michael Dimock & Richard Wike, America Is Exceptional in the Nature of
Its Political Divide, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 13, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank
/2020/11/13/america-is-exceptional-in-the-nature-of-its-political-divide [perma.cc/RH8N-HCL7]
(“Americans have rarely been as polarized as they are today.”).
16. Compare Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 140 S. Ct. 1104 (2020) (granting certiorari on
February 24, 2020), with Who’s the Bigot?, OXFORD UNIV. PRESS, https://global.oup.com/academic/product/whos-the-bigot-9780190877200 [perma.cc/CJ77-Y8G7] (noting publication date
of March 2, 2020).
17. See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin, Foster Care—in Whose Best Interest?, 43 HARV. EDUC.
REV. 599 (1973) (proposing new standards to limit removing children from their homes and
placing them into foster care); Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of “Neglected” Children: Standards for Removal of Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in
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rights issues. 18 In the past two decades, however, scholars have increasingly
turned to civil rights discourse in order to frame child welfare problems, in
both LGBTQ and non-LGBTQ contexts. 19 In connecting McClain’s book to
legal scholarship on LGBTQ child welfare and the Fulton controversy, this
Review illustrates the importance of viewing LGBTQ child welfare issues
through a civil rights lens. Many of the themes discussed in McClain’s book
reemerge in Fulton, especially in briefs and oral argument. 20 As a result,
McClain’s important work provides a framework for understanding how rhetoric involving bigotry is being harnessed by both sides of the ongoing legal
battles over broad religious exemptions and LGBTQ child welfare.
This Review proceeds in three Parts. Part I articulates the book’s thesis
and core arguments. Part II situates LGBTQ child welfare literature in the
conflict between civil rights and religious liberty. Part III then extends
McClain’s analysis to trace the rhetoric of bigotry in the Fulton controversy.
I.

EXAMINING BIGOTRY

A. Sites of Contestation over Bigotry
Early in the book, McClain lays a foundation for her core arguments by
introducing four puzzles about bigotry. First, does a charge of bigotry concern
the motivation behind a belief or an act? (p. 6). Second, does the content of a
belief, as opposed to its motivation, invite the label of bigotry? (p. 8). Third,
how does time factor into judgments about bigotry, and more specifically,
how does the scope of what is considered bigotry change with societal shifts
about what is unreasonable or unacceptable? (p. 9). Fourth, does the label of
“bigot” suggest a type of character with distinct psychological or moral traits?
(p. 11). After these puzzles are situated in relation to social science research
on prejudice in chapter 2, the heart of the book examines these puzzles by
tracing the rhetoric of bigotry in past and present controversies over marriage
and civil rights.

Foster Care, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1976) (discussing the
inadequacies of laws regarding the removal of children from their homes).
18. Dorothy E. Roberts, Child Welfare and Civil Rights, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 171, 172; see
also Annette R. Appell, “Bad” Mothers and Spanish-Speaking Caregivers, 7 NEV. L.J. 759, 759
(2007) (“[T]here is very little discussion about child welfare in civil rights . . . studies.”).
19. See, e.g., Annette Ruth Appell, Uneasy Tensions Between Children’s Rights and Civil
Rights, 5 NEV. L.J. 141 (2004) (using the Indian Child Welfare Act as a lens to discuss the opposition between, and intersection of, children’s rights and civil rights); Roberts, supra note 18, at
182 (“Viewing the racial disparity in the child welfare system as a group-based civil rights violation suggests an unorthodox form of redress.”); Jordan Blair Woods, Religious Exemptions and
LGBTQ Child Welfare, 103 MINN. L. REV. 2343, 2418–19 (2019) (framing challenges of LGBTQ
youth in the child welfare system as civil rights problems).
20. See infra Part III.
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Interfaith Marriage

The first controversy that McClain examines is the debate over interfaith
marriage in the 1950s and 1960s (chapter 3). Looking to prominent secular
and religious writings, McClain focuses on whether opposition to interfaith
marriage was framed in terms of bigotry or other considerations (p. 48).
McClain describes how many secular and religious commentators explained
the growth of interfaith marriage as the inevitable outcome of increased immigration, assimilation, and social contact in colleges and the workplace
(p. 51). Bigotry was also relevant to young people’s motivations to enter into
interfaith marriages (p. 50), which some commentators surmised was a form
of protest against bigotry (pp. 56–57).
Some commentators, however, pushed against the view that opposition
to interfaith marriage was solely based on “intolerance at odds with the American creed” (p. 59). Instead, many objectors rested their opposition on “legitimate” claims that interfaith marriage threatened marital happiness, the
preservation of religious and ethnic heritage, duties of conscience, and children’s well-being (p. 50). At the same time, McClain explains that not all objections to interfaith marriage were necessarily benign, and prejudice often
played a role in animating objections to interfaith marriage (pp. 63–64).
2.

Theologies of Segregation and Integration

Next, McClain turns to the debate over racial segregation, focusing primarily on the years after the Supreme Court’s 1954 landmark decision in
Brown v. Board of Education. 21 Looking to political speeches, official positions
taken by religious groups, sermons, public addresses, and writings by clergy
(p. 77), McClain illustrates how religious and political leaders who opposed
desegregation often grounded their views in biblical, scientific, and historical
sources, rather than language of bigotry and prejudice (p. 79, 82). For instance, opponents of desegregation appealed to scripture to justify ideas of racial difference and attempts to preserve racial purity (p. 83). They also relied
on scientific ideas based on eugenic premises to rationalize white supremacy
and frame racial mixing as a threat to the white race (pp. 84–85). In doing so,
opponents of desegregation framed race consciousness, and thus segregation,
as a necessary virtue rather than as a bigoted belief (p. 80).
Conversely, religious and political leaders who opposed segregation often
looked to biblical, scientific, and historical sources to condemn racial bigotry.
Specifically, McClain describes how leaders stressed the universal nature of the
Christian faith and appealed to religious conscience to reject myths of racial
difference (pp. 87–88). They further denounced the idea that science supports
racial segregation or racial prejudice and supported their views with updated

21.

Ch. 4; see 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
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scientific studies (p. 91). Leaders who opposed segregation expressed concerns about being on the wrong side of history and emphasized that racial discrimination was inconsistent with American constitutional ideals (pp. 89–90).
At the same time, the discourse of “bigotry” was not entirely absent from
these debates over racial segregation. As McClain discusses, many religious
and political leaders who opposed desegregation emphasized the need to respond to frequent charges of bigotry (p. 81). Conversely, some leaders who
opposed segregation invoked language of bigotry at times to interrogate their
own racial prejudices (pp. 91–92). Other leaders who opposed segregation
placed primacy on the environmental causes of intolerance and discrimination to advance the view that their opponents needed to be “rescued from bigotry and prejudice.” (pp. 92–93).
McClain argues that competing theological views on segregation and integration persisted in the political domain as Congress considered federal civil
rights legislation in the 1960s—the next major controversy examined in the book.
3.

The Civil Rights Act of 1964

McClain’s examination of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in chapter 5 uncovers the diversity of rhetorical strategies involving bigotry deployed in the
civil rights struggles of the past. 22 McClain begins by tracing the various ways
in which legislators and civil rights leaders appealed to both conscience and
the rhetoric of bigotry (pp. 106–15). Proponents of the Civil Rights Act argued
that conscience and morality demanded a repudiation of bigotry through federal legislation (p. 106). They further argued that precedent supported Congress’s authority to address moral issues, including racial discrimination,
through legislation (p. 111). Legislators who opposed the Act also appealed to
conscience while refuting and reversing allegations of bigotry (pp. 115–26).
Some opponents defended segregation as rooted in morality and of divine
origin, arguing that racial difference derived from natural law (pp. 115–18).
Others rejected the idea that equality was a natural feature of humanity, arguing instead that racial difference and racial inequality derived from “nature
and natural law” (p. 118).
McClain’s close reading of the debates reveals differences in how legislators and civil rights leaders viewed the function and effect of law. Some proponents took more of a realist stance by claiming that even if federal
legislation could not change racist attitudes, it could regulate behavior and
prohibit discriminatory conduct (p. 112). Other supporters, however, stressed
the educative function of law and pointed to the acceptance of state and local
antidiscrimination laws as indicating that the Civil Rights Act could eventually change racist beliefs and attitudes (pp. 112–13). Conversely, some of the
Act’s opponents argued that individuals had a right to discriminate and that

22. McClain focuses primarily on evidence from the debates over Title II of the Act, which
prohibits discrimination based on race, among other characteristics, in places of public accommodations. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a).
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it was not the government’s role to legislate morality (p. 120). Others argued
that the Act would exacerbate bigotry and that state, local, and nonlegal solutions would better address racial discrimination (p. 123). These debates over
the function and effect of law continued in future controversies over marriage
and the scope of civil rights, including interracial marriage.
4.

Interracial Marriage

In chapter 6, McClain evaluates the rhetoric of bigotry surrounding Loving v. Virginia, the landmark 1967 Supreme Court decision striking down prohibitions on interracial marriage. 23 McClain’s compelling analysis uses Loving
to demonstrate the backward- and forward-looking dimensions of bigotry
(p. 128). The analysis also traces recurring ways in which relevant actors invoked the notion of bigotry to frame legal arguments in the controversy.
One example McClain gives of backward-looking bigotry is the similarity
between arguments against interfaith marriage and those the Commonwealth
of Virginia and its amici raised in defense of the antimiscegenation law challenged in Loving. Like the religious and political leaders McClain discusses in
chapter 3, the commonwealth argued that its stance was rooted in a reasonable
desire to prevent marital problems, avoid harm to children, and preserve religious and ethnic identity and heritage (pp. 130–35). The commonwealth also
invoked scientific sources that purported to support those ideas (p. 131). In
stressing interests other than bigotry, Virginia and its amici rejected allegations that prejudice motivated their positions (pp. 130–35).
Although the Lovings and their amici did not explicitly use the term “bigotry,” they claimed that racial intolerance motivated Virginia’s antimiscegenation law (pp. 135–36). To counter the scientific authority cited by Virginia,
the Lovings and their amici referenced updated scientific research discounting
the idea that interracial marriage was harmful to spouses and their children
(p. 137). They also stressed the immense social harm that the law engendered,
including deeming the children of interracial married couples illegitimate,
preventing spouses from inheriting from one another, and enabling husbands
to desert their families without any consequences (pp. 136–38). The Lovings
identified society’s racial prejudice, and not interracial marriage itself, as the
root cause of any potential harms related to interracial marriage (p. 138).
As McClain discusses, other arguments that the Lovings advanced illustrate the forward-looking dimensions of bigotry. Specifically, the Lovings argued that invalidating Virginia’s antimiscegenation law would send an
important signal of constitutional and moral progress (p. 136). Consistent
with this view, McClain characterizes Loving as a symbol of generational
moral progress. 24

23. Pp. 127–53; 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
24. P. 139. McClain describes the societal shift in framing marriage as a private choice
that should be free from governmental interference as one potential explanation for the differing
aftermaths of Loving and Brown. P. 140.
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To illustrate this point, McClain looks ahead to the role of Loving in litigation challenging Virginia’s ban on same-sex marriage some fifty years later
in 2014. 25 McClain persuasively traces how, in this subsequent litigation, Loving animated ideas of constitutional moral progress and the desire to avoid
being on the wrong side of history (p. 141). At the same time, McClain carefully recognizes contested interpretations of Loving and uses Obergefell v.
Hodges to explore this point. 26 Defenders of restrictive marriage laws in Obergefell distinguished Loving, a rightful denouncement of a relic of slavery, from
laws prohibiting same-sex marriage, which they held to be grounded in common sense and children’s well-being (p. 148). These competing views of Loving set the stage for the next civil rights controversy evaluated in the book: the
Court’s evolving constitutional approach to lesbian and gay rights and samesex marriage.
5.

Lesbian and Gay Rights and Same-Sex Marriage

Chapter 7, perhaps the most ambitious chapter of McClain’s book, examines the rhetoric of bigotry and appeals to conscience in the briefing and opinions between the Court’s 1986 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick 27 and its 2015
decision in Obergefell. As McClain’s analysis shows, early defenders of laws
denying lesbian and gay rights rejected allegations that their positions were
rooted in animus or bigotry and emphasized sincere beliefs and moral judgments instead (pp. 156–57). In Bowers, the Court infamously upheld the constitutionality of Georgia’s sodomy ban. 28 The state argued that the Eleventh
Circuit’s decision invalidating the law ignored “the traditions and collective
conscience of our nation.” 29 In reversing the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, Justice White’s majority opinion in Bowers affirmed the state’s view of morality
as constitutional justification for law, stressing that the law “is constantly
based on notions of morality.” 30
The status of morality as a sufficient constitutional justification for law,
however, became more uncertain over time. On this point, McClain looks to
the briefing and opinions in two key cases. The first is Romer v. Evans, the
1996 decision in which the Court held that an amendment to Colorado’s constitution that would have prohibited state and local antidiscrimination protections for lesbians, gays, and bisexuals in Colorado violated the Equal
Protection Clause. 31 The second is Lawrence v. Texas, the 2003 decision in

25. Pp. 141–47; see Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 461 (E.D. Va.), aff’d sub nom.
Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014).
26. 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
27. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
28. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
29. P. 158; Brief of Petitioner at 25, Bowers, 478 U.S. 186 (No. 85-140).
30. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
31. 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996).
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which the Court overruled Bowers and invalidated Texas’s “homosexual conduct” law on due process grounds. 32
Notably, Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion in both cases. In
Romer, Justice Kennedy concluded that “the amendment seems inexplicable
by anything but animus toward the class it affects.” 33 In so concluding, Justice
Kennedy relied on the Court’s prior decision in Department of Agriculture v.
Moreno as support for the illegitimacy of grounding law in the “bare . . . desire
to harm a politically unpopular group.” 34 In Lawrence, however, Justice Kennedy stressed that the criminal law cannot be used to enforce the beliefs of
individuals who morally disagree with same-sex sex, but he did so without
labelling those beliefs as animus or bigotry. 35
Justice Scalia, by contrast, dissented in both cases. In Romer, Justice Scalia
denied the claims of animus leveled in Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion and
lodged countercharges of bigotry, stating that “[t]he only sort of ‘animus’ at
issue here [is] moral disapproval of homosexual conduct.” 36 Justice Scalia did
not use explicit language of bigotry in his dissent in Lawrence (pp. 162–63).
Instead, he emphasized the legitimacy of morality in justifying criminal law
and warned that the majority’s approach “effectively decrees the end of all
morals legislation.” 37
McClain explains that with the declining status of morality as a constitutional justification for law, defenders of laws denying lesbian and gay rights
modified their positions to place greater emphasis on other public-policy interests, such as preserving marriage and families (p. 156–57). Such arguments
were made by supporters of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), section 3
of which was struck down in the Court’s landmark 2013 decision, United
States v. Windsor. 38 Defenders of DOMA emphasized state interests other
than moral disproval, such as responsible procreation and childrearing
(p. 171). Some amici, however, still relied on Justice Scalia’s dissents in Romer
and Lawrence to claim that moral disapproval was a legitimate basis for a law
(p. 171). On the other side of the controversy, opponents of DOMA drew on
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinions in Romer and Lawrence to argue that
DOMA’s restrictive marriage definition was rooted in animus and moral disapproval (p. 172).
This important chapter of the book also foreshadows the role of rhetoric
involving bigotry in conflicts between same-sex marriage and religious-liberty
claims (pp. 173–74). The clash between same-sex marriage and religious-liberty claims would play a greater role in Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in

32. 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003).
33. Romer, 517 U.S. at 622.
34. P. 167; Romer, 517 U.S. at 634–35 (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,
534 (1973)).
35. P. 161; Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571.
36. P. 168; Romer, 517 U.S. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
37. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
38. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
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Obergefell, which recognized a constitutional right for same-sex couples to
marry. 39 McClain traces Justice Kennedy’s several references to Loving in his
majority opinion but notes that he did not go so far as to denounce the endorsement of traditional definitions of marriage as comparable to the endorsement of racist ideas (p. 180). Rather, Justice Kennedy struck a different
tone, eschewing a rhetoric of bigotry and instead stressing that many people
disapprove of same-sex marriage based on “decent and honorable religious or
philosophical premises.” 40 This language would become critical in post-Obergefell conflicts between same-sex marriage and religious-liberty claims.
6.

Conflicts Between Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty Claims

The conflict between same-sex marriage and religious-liberty claims in
public accommodations law is the last civil rights struggle examined in
McClain’s book (chapter 8). A centerpiece of McClain’s analysis is a close
reading of the rhetoric of bigotry used by the participants in Masterpiece
Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission. 41 The case involved Jack Phillips, a business owner and devout Christian who refused to design and bake a
cake for a same-sex couple’s wedding celebration. 42 The Colorado Civil Rights
Commission (CCRC) found that Phillips violated a Colorado public accommodations law prohibiting businesses from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation, a finding that the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed. 43
McClain’s analysis illuminates three key themes that, as described later in
this Review, recur in the Fulton controversy. 44 First, only some of the briefs on
either side explicitly used the rhetoric of bigotry (p. 192). Phillips and his
amici argued that the CRCC acted with hostility and animosity toward his religion, pointing to a comment that a commissioner made during a hearing as
evidence. 45 They also referred to Phillips’s conscience and religious sincerity,
at times drawing on language from Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in
Obergefell to describe Phillips’s beliefs as “decent and honorable” (p. 196).
McClain describes how this strategy distinguished Philips from society’s typical image of a bigot (p. 196). Sensitive to this point, the respondents and their
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

576 U.S. 644, 681 (2015).
Id. at 672.
Pp. 191–209; 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
138 S. Ct. at 1724.
Id. at 1725–27.
See infra Part III.
P. 194. Specifically, the Commissioner said:

I would also like to reiterate what we said in the hearing or the last meeting. Freedom of
religion and religion has been used to justify all kinds of discrimination throughout history, whether it be slavery, whether it be the holocaust, whether it be—I mean, we—we
can list hundreds of situations where freedom of religion has been used to justify discrimination. And to me it is one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use
to—to use their religion to hurt others.

Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729.
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amici also refrained from labeling Phillips a bigot or making claims that Phillips’s actions were motivated by animus or hostility (p. 199). Instead, they emphasized that the Colorado public accommodation law in dispute focused on
conduct—namely, sexual-orientation discrimination (pp. 199–200).
The second important theme involves competing interpretations of how
past challenges to landmark civil rights laws compare to current challenges to
public accommodation laws affording sexual-orientation protection (p. 192).
For instance, Phillips’s amici contrasted bigoted underpinnings of past opposition to interracial marriage with Phillips’s adherence to traditionally “decent
and honorable” views of marriage (p. 196). Conversely, the respondents and
their amici stressed the value of learning from past civil rights struggles, noting courts’ previous rejection of attempts to justify race and sex discrimination
on First Amendment religious-liberty grounds (pp. 201–03).
The third important theme is the participants’ agreement on the value of
civility, tolerance, and pluralism, as contrasted with their disagreement over
what those values require (p. 193). Phillips and his amici argued that ruling
against his religious-liberty claim would undermine efforts to “promote tolerance and mutual respect in a pluralistic national community,” 46 whereas the
respondents and their amici stressed that civility and tolerance sometimes demand that people be restrained from acting on their beliefs—even sincerely
held religious beliefs—in businesses and other places of public accommodation (p. 193).
These themes reappeared during oral argument and in the opinions in
Masterpiece Cakeshop, leading McClain to conclude that rhetoric matters in
how participants approach conflicts between marriage and civil rights law
(p. 205). For instance, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion, joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Breyer, Kagan, and Gorsuch, held that the
CRCC violated Phillips’s free-exercise rights by failing to consider his religiously motivated claims in a “neutral and respectful” way. 47 As McClain notes,
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion did not refer to language of bigotry, animosity, or hostility to describe the stakes for the same-sex couple involved in
the case (p. 205). Rather, it only used such language to condemn the actions of
CRCC in enforcing Colorado’s antidiscrimination law against Phillips (p. 205).
McClain stresses that the reasoning in Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion
poses an important question for future cases: “How should public officials talk
about religion when they consider whether a religiously motivated refusal of
service violated civil rights law?” (p. 206). McClain views Justice Kagan’s separate concurrence as providing a potential path (p. 205). The Justice posits
that although state actors cannot show hostility towards a person’s religious
46. P. 199; Brief of Amici Curiae 34 Legal Scholars in Support of Petitioners at 27, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1718 (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 4005667.
47. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729. Importantly, the majority opinion in Masterpiece Cakeshop did not go so far as to conclude that the CRCC had violated Phillips’s freeexercise rights by refusing to grant him an exemption from Colorado’s antidiscrimination law.
See Douglas NeJaime & Reva Siegel, Religious Exemptions and Antidiscrimination Law in Masterpiece Cakeshop, 128 YALE L.J.F. 201, 202 (2018).
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views, state law can protect members of social groups from discrimination in
receiving goods and services under a general and neutral public accommodations law. 48 However, Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion, joined by Justice
Gorsuch, demonstrates that countercharges of bigotry are likely to persist
from public accommodation law opponents (p. 208). Justice Thomas’s concurrence not only fully embraced Phillips’s First Amendment argument but
also quoted Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent in Obergefell that warned against
“portray[ing] everyone who does not share” the view that the Constitution
protects same-sex couples’ right to marry “ ‘as bigoted’ and unentitled to express a different view.” 49 As McClain notes, this was the only time that explicit
language of bigotry was used in any of the opinions in Masterpiece Cakeshop
(p. 208).
B. Bigotry’s Lessons
In the book’s final chapter, Professor McClain returns to the four puzzles
about bigotry and sketches several valuable lessons that emerge from her analysis. Revisiting the first puzzle (Does a charge of bigotry concern the motivation behind a belief or an act? (p. 6)), McClain warns that defining bigotry
solely in terms of hateful motives or acts overlooks the historical importance of
religious intolerance as a form of bigotry (p. 212). For this reason, McClain argues that the tendency to frame current struggles over marriage and the scope
of civil rights in terms of “bigotry versus conscience” misses the mark (p. 213).
McClain contends that the legal question in these struggles should focus on
whether discrimination exists and causes harm, not whether sincere beliefs or
appeals to conscience deserve moral condemnation as bigotry (p. 213).
McClain emphasizes the importance of time regarding the second puzzle
(Does the content of a belief, as opposed to its motivation, invite the label of
bigotry? (p. 8)). McClain underscores that bigoted beliefs are generally viewed
as unreasonable in society, whereas denials of bigotry commonly invoke the
reasonableness of the underlying beliefs (p. 213). What is considered reasonable or unreasonable in society, however, changes over time, especially in the
wake of social movements. Accordingly, what is or is not considered bigoted
also changes over time (p. 213).
Revisiting the third puzzle (How does what is considered bigotry change
with what is considered unreasonable or unacceptable? (p. 9)), McClain emphasizes both the backward-looking and forward-looking dimensions of bigotry (p. 215). Thinking backward, McClain identifies two lessons: First, it may
not be possible to condemn beliefs or practices as bigotry before society has
already moved significantly away from them (p. 215). Second, while repudiating bigotry appears to be a shared value, the United States has not always lived

48. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1732 (Kagan, J., concurring).
49. Id. at 1747 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 712
(2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)).
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up to that ideal (p. 215). McClain concludes that the forward-looking dimension of bigotry is relevant when people warn about the flaring up of old forms
of bigotry or draw analogies from old forms of bigotry to identify new forms
(p. 215). McClain stresses that learning from the past is relevant to both, but
that people do not always agree on what lessons to take from history (p. 215).
Finally, McClain offers some lessons on the fourth puzzle (Does the label
of “bigot” suggest a type of character with distinct psychological or moral
traits? (p. 11)). McClain emphasizes that describing bigotry in terms of something that is in everyone’s brain can deflate the strong negative moral judgment tied to being called a bigot (p. 216). This may prove challenging, as even
discussion of implicit bias can be associated with charges of bigotry in today’s
polarized society (p. 217).
II.

LGBTQ CHILD WELFARE AS CIVIL RIGHTS

Who’s the Bigot? has much to offer for understanding the rhetoric of bigotry in current conflicts over religious liberty claims and same-sex marriage
in the child welfare space. But we must first understand the landscape of LGBTQ
child welfare as one of civil rights. Although the public child welfare system has
existed for over a century, 50 scholars have not historically approached problems in child welfare as civil rights issues. 51 In the past two decades, however,
an increasing number of scholars have turned to civil rights discourse to frame
child welfare problems, both in LGBTQ and non-LGBTQ contexts. 52
Looking back to history is instructive for understanding the conflict between religious liberty claims and LGBTQ equality in the child welfare space
as a civil rights issue. Until the early 1970s, almost every state criminalized
same-sex sex, 53 and the dominant view in the mental health profession stigmatized homosexuality as a mental disease. 54 These attitudes made it virtually
impossible for lesbians or gay men to openly foster or adopt. 55 In family
courts, judges embraced stereotypes of lesbian and gay adults as sexual predators and threats to children in order to deem them unfit parents; they often

50. Cf. James G. Dwyer, A Constitutional Birthright: The State, Parentage, and the Rights
of Newborn Persons, 56 UCLA L. REV. 755, 805 (2009) (“Throughout the twentieth century, the
federal government played an expanding role in child welfare.”).
51. Appell, supra note 19, at 759; Roberts, supra note 18, at 172.
52. See, e.g., Appell, supra note 18, at 141; Roberts, supra note 18, at 182; Woods, supra
note 18, at 2418–19.
53. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY LAWS IN AMERICA,
1861–2003, at 136–94 (2008) (discussing sodomy-law reform starting in the 1960s).
54. RONALD BAYER, HOMOSEXUALITY AND AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY: THE POLITICS OF
DIAGNOSIS 15–40 (1981).
55. See David L. Chambers & Nancy D. Polikoff, Family Law and Gay and Lesbian Family
Issues in the Twentieth Century, 33 FAM. L.Q. 523, 535 (1999) (noting that issues of lesbian and
gay adoption and foster parenting first surfaced in the 1970s).
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relied on sodomy statutes and stigmatizing notions of mental illness to rationalize those views. 56 LGBTQ youth had to hide their LGBTQ identities to receive help from the child welfare system and were often kicked out of child
welfare placements upon discovery of their LGBTQ identities. 57
In the early 1970s, nonprofit organizations and public child welfare agencies started to place LGBTQ teenagers who had no other viable placement options with openly lesbian and gay foster parents. 58 Two currents facilitated
these new arrangements. First, during the 1960s and 1970s, the number of
youth in foster care nearly doubled to almost 500,000. 59 Overburdened child
welfare agencies started to seek different solutions to address the foster-care
crisis, especially for youth like LGBTQ teenagers who had a much more difficult time finding out-of-home placement in foster care. 60 Second, a wave of
states in the early 1970s decriminalized private consensual same-sex sex, and
the view of homosexuality as a mental disease began to lose force, as illustrated
by the American Psychiatric Association’s removal of homosexuality from the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders in 1973. 61 These shifts
created room for mental-health professionals to conceive of lesbians and gays
as suitable foster and adoptive parents rather than as sexual predators. 62 Looking ahead, these new arrangements paved the way for child welfare agencies
to expand placements with lesbian and gay parents to include non-LGBTQ
youth. 63
In the 1980s and 1990s, however, public backlash and media attention descended on new foster arrangements that welcomed lesbian and gay parents,
engendering a wave of legal restrictions on lesbian and gay foster and adoptive

56. Diana Hassel, The Use of Criminal Sodomy Laws in Civil Litigation, 79 TEX. L. REV.
813, 831 (2001) (“The assumption that a gay parent is committing the crime of sodomy motivates many decisions concerning custody.”); see also Nan D. Hunter & Nancy D. Polikoff, Custody Rights of Lesbian Mothers: Legal Theory and Litigation Strategy, 25 BUFF. L. REV. 691 (1976)
(discussing legal challenges surrounding custody for lesbian mothers).
57. Woods, supra note 18, at 2369.
58. Nancy D. Polikoff, Lesbian and Gay Couples Raising Children: The Law in the United
States, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 153, 157 (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenæs eds., 2001) (describing how the National Gay Task Force worked with New York City child welfare agencies to develop a network of gay foster homes for homeless gay teenagers).
59. Leroy H. Pelton, Welfare Discrimination and Child Welfare, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1479,
1488 (1999).
60. Woods, supra note 18, at 2373 & n.175.
61. BAYER, supra note 54, at 40 (discussing the repeal of sexual psychopath laws); see
ESKRIDGE, supra note 53, at 136–94.
62. Illustrating this point, the American Psychological Association adopted a resolution
in 1976 that took the position that sexual orientation should not be the “sole or primary variable
considered in custody or placement cases.” John J. Conger, Proceedings of the American Psychological Association, Incorporated, for the Year 1976: Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the Council
of Representatives, 32 AM. PSYCH. 408, 432 (1977).
63. Marie-Amélie George, Agency Nullification: Defying Bans on Gay and Lesbian Foster
and Adoptive Parents, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 363, 378 (2016).
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parenting. 64 For instance, in 1985 the Massachusetts Department of Social
Services adopted a new policy that significantly limited the ability of lesbians
and gay men to become foster or adoptive parents. 65 Two years later, New
Hampshire became the first state to pass a statute banning such possibilities. 66
As these restrictions grew, other states took the opposite approach by adopting the first antidiscrimination policies in child welfare that included protection based on sexual orientation. 67 In 1982, New York issued the first statewide
agency policy that prohibited denying prospective parents adoption solely on
the basis of their sexual orientation. 68 Soon after, New Jersey, New Mexico,
and Vermont adopted similar policies. 69 These protections increased possibilities for LGBTQ teenagers to find supportive out-of-home placements in the
child welfare system. 70
In the early 2000s, comprehensive child welfare reform emerged as a priority among national LGBTQ advocacy organizations. 71 Calls for child welfare
reform went beyond sexual-orientation matching for difficult-to-place
LGBTQ teenagers to tackle the systemic and cultural obstacles that LGBTQ
youth commonly experienced in child welfare settings. 72 As a result of these
mobilization efforts, over twenty-five states adopted new measures that provided antidiscrimination protections to youth in the child welfare system
based on sexual orientation or gender identity between 2003 and 2015. 73
Religious exemption laws in LGBTQ child welfare operate against the
backdrop of these growing antidiscrimination measures. Currently, eleven
states have broad religious exemption laws involving LGBTQ child welfare,
and more states could introduce new measures. 74 These laws “allow the religious or moral views of key actors in the child welfare system (for example,
64. CARLOS A. BALL, THE RIGHT TO BE PARENTS: LGBT FAMILIES AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF PARENTHOOD 148–50 (2012); Woods, supra note 18, at 2378–79.
65. WENDELL RICKETTS, LESBIANS AND GAY MEN AS FOSTER PARENTS 42–50 (photo.
reprt. 2008) (1991).
66. Act of May 27, 1987, ch. 343, 1987 N.H. Laws 379 (amended 1999); Chambers & Polikoff, supra note 55, at 537.
67. Woods, supra note 18, at 2383.
68. N.Y. DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS., STANDARD OF PRACTICE FOR ADOPTION SERVICES 15
(1982), https://ocfs.ny.gov/main/policies/external/1982/ADMs/1982%20ADM-50%20part%201%
20Standards%20of%20Practice%20for%20Adoption%20Services.pdf [perma.cc/9RLG-G943].
69. See Beverly A. Uhl, Note, A New Issue in Foster Parenting—Gays, 25 J. FAM. L. 577,
581 & n.33 (1986).
70. Woods, supra note 18, at 2384.
71. Rudy Estrada & Jody Marksamer, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Young
People in State Custody: Making the Child Welfare and Juvenile Justice Systems Safe for All Youth
Through Litigation, Advocacy, and Education, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 415, 416–18 (2006).
72. Woods, supra note 18, at 2385–86.
73. Id. at 2390 n.311.
74. ALA. CODE § 26-10D-5 (LexisNexis Supp. 2020); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5322 (Supp.
2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.124e(2)–(3) (2019); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 11-62-5(2)–(3)
(2019); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-12-07.1 (2018); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 1-8-112 (Supp.
2021); Act of June 29, 2018, No. 264, § 38.29, 2018 S.C. Acts 1905, 2265; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
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private child welfare providers, caseworkers, or foster or adoptive parents) to
guide the nature of the child welfare services they provide, even if their views
denounce LGBTQ people.” 75
The push for these broad exemptions primarily emerged after the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Obergefell recognizing a constitutional right
of same-sex couples to marry. 76 In fact, nine of the eleven states that currently
have broad religious exemption laws involving LGBTQ child welfare passed
those laws after Obergefell. 77 Viewing this push through the historical lens
above, however, reveals deeper civil rights consequences of granting broad religious exemptions in LGBTQ child welfare. As I argue in prior work, these
exemptions function as “a vehicle for long-enduring anxieties about sexual
‘deviance’” regarding individuals (both adults and youth) “who veer from traditional norms of sex, sexuality, and gender.” 78 These broad exemptions also
“sustain and propagate sexual deviance concepts by substituting and equating
the religious or moral views of child welfare actors with the best interests of
youth regarding appropriate sexual orientation and gender identity development and expression.” 79
The relatively recent and growing body of research on LGBTQ foster
youth illustrates these deeper civil rights consequences. For instance, research
shows that LGBTQ youth, especially LGBTQ youth of color, are overrepresented in the foster care system. 80 LGBTQ youth frequently enter foster care
as a result of family rejection related to their LGBTQ identities. 81 After entering the child welfare system, LGBTQ youth are also at greater risk for experiencing instability and mistreatment for reasons related to their LGBTQ

§ 26-6-38 (Supp. 2020); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-147 (Supp. 2020); TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN.
§ 45.004 (West 2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1709.3 (2017).
75. Woods, supra note 18, at 2347.
76. See id. at 2392; Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
77. See supra note 74.
78. Woods, supra note 18, at 2354.
79. Id. at 2350.
80. Laura Baams, Bianca D.M. Wilson & Stephen T. Russell, LGBTQ Youth in Unstable
Housing and Foster Care, 143 PEDIATRICS art. e20174211, at 4 (2019), https://doi.org/10.1542
/peds.2017-4211 (“[T]he proportion of LGBTQ youth in foster care and unstable housing is 2.3
to 2.7 times larger than would be expected from estimates of LGBTQ youth in nationally representative adolescent samples.”); Jessica N. Fish, Laura Baams, Armeda Stevenson Wojciak & Stephen T. Russell, Are Sexual Minority Youth Overrepresented in Foster Care, Child Welfare, and
Out-of-Home Placement? Findings from Nationally Representative Data, 89 CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT 203 (2019); BIANCA D.M. WILSON, KHUSH COOPER, ANGELIKI KASTANIS & SHEILA
NEZHAD, WILLIAMS INST., SEXUAL AND GENDER MINORITY YOUTH IN FOSTER CARE: ASSESSING
DISPROPORTIONALITY AND DISPARITIES IN LOS ANGELES 6, 22 (2014), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/LAFYS_report_final-aug-2014.pdf [perma.cc/72QP-R8E7]
(reporting findings that 19.1 percent of youth in the Los Angeles County foster system identified
as LGBTQ and that over 80 percent of those foster youth identified as youth of color).
81. Martha Albertson Fineman, Vulnerability, Resilience, and LGBT Youth, 23 TEMP.
POL. & C.R.L. REV. 307, 322 (2014) (“Family conflict over a youth’s sexual orientation and gender
identity is a significant element that leads to . . . the need to enter the child welfare system.”).
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identities. 82 These common failures lead many LGBTQ youth to disengage
with the child welfare system entirely, thereby fueling an epidemic of LGBTQ
youth homelessness in the United States. 83
III. THE RHETORIC OF BIGOTRY IN FULTON
McClain’s framework offers insight into the role that the rhetoric of bigotry plays when conflicts over religious-liberty claims and LGBTQ child welfare are approached from a civil rights perspective. As this Part discusses,
many of the patterns that McClain identifies in the book recur in Fulton v.
City of Philadelphia—the latest controversy over marriage and the scope of
civil rights before the Supreme Court. 84
For context, it is instructive to summarize the facts and holding of the
Fulton case. The issue in Fulton focused on whether the government violates
the First Amendment by denying private, faith-based agencies an exemption
from compliance with antidiscrimination laws when they contract with the
government and receive taxpayer funds to provide child welfare services. 85
The underlying dispute involved Catholic Social Services (CSS), a private
faith-based organization that was one of thirty organizations that contracted
with the City of Philadelphia to provide foster care and adoption services. 86
CSS refused to work with same-sex couples seeking to become foster parents,
in violation of a City of Philadelphia nondiscrimination ordinance prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in public accommodations. 87 After CSS
refused to comply with the city’s public accommodation law, the city decided
not to renew CSS’s contract. 88 CSS then filed suit and sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction requiring the city to continue
providing foster care referrals to CSS without requiring the agency to certify
same-sex couples. 89

82. Adam McCormick, Kathryn Schmidt & Samuel R. Terrazas, Foster Family Acceptance: Understanding the Role of Foster Family Acceptance in the Lives of LGBTQ Youth, 61
CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 69, 73–74 (2016) (listing the challenges faced by LGBTQ youth in
the child welfare system); see also Woods, supra note 18, at 2405–06.
83. See LES WHITBECK, MELISSA WELCH LAZORITZ, DEVAN CRAWFORD & DANE
HAUTALA, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., DATA COLLECTION STUDY FINAL REPORT 9,
11 (2016), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fysb/data_collection_study_final_report_street_outreach_program.pdf [perma.cc/MH56-6TEB] (“The percentage of youth experiencing homelessness who self-identify as LGBT is reported on average as between 20 to 40
percent, a proportion that is quite high compared to the 3 to 5 percent of the nation’s general
population who self-identify as LGBT.”).
84. See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019), rev’d, 141 S. Ct. 1868
(2021).
85. Fulton, 922 F.3d at 153–54.
86. Id. at 147–51.
87. Id. at 148.
88. Id. at 150.
89. Id. at 151.
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The district court ruled in favor of the City of Philadelphia, and the Third
Circuit affirmed. 90 In a 9–0 decision, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of
CSS. 91 Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, held that Philadelphia violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment by refusing to contract with CSS for foster-care services unless CSS agreed to certify same-sex
couples as foster parents. 92 Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh,
and Barrett joined the Court’s opinion. 93 Justices Barrett, Alito, and Gorsuch
each wrote separate concurring opinions. 94
Notably, the participants’ arguments in Fulton align perfectly with the
three key themes that McClain’s analysis exposes about the rhetoric of bigotry
in Masterpiece Cakeshop. 95 First, similar to what McClain’s analysis revealed
about the briefing in the Masterpiece Cakeshop case, very few of the briefs submitted to the Court on either side in Fulton explicitly used the rhetoric of bigotry. 96 More commonly, CSS and their amici argued that the City of
Philadelphia acted with hostility or animosity towards CSS’s religion. 97 They
also refer to CSS’s conscience and religious sincerity, at times invoking language from Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Obergefell to describe CSS’s
beliefs as “decent and honorable,” which also appeared in the briefing for Masterpiece Cakeshop. 98 As for the other side, the respondents and their amici denied claims that the city acted with animus or hostility towards CSS’s
religion, 99 instead emphasizing that the city’s public accommodations law
prohibits discriminatory conduct, not speech or religion. 100 They also refrained from using the rhetoric of bigotry to describe CSS’s policy.

90. Id. at 146–47.
91. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1873 (2021).
92. Id. at 1868.
93. Id. at 1873.
94. Id. at 1882 (Barrett, J., concurring); id. at 1883 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment);
id. at 1926 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).
95. See supra Section I.A.6.
96. A Westlaw search using the term “bigot!” in the briefs submitted to the Court in Fulton reveals that only the petitioners’ brief and five of the seventy-nine amicus briefs explicitly
referenced the rhetoric of bigotry (for instance, “bigotry,” “bigoted,” or “bigot”).
97. A Westlaw search using the term “hostil!” or “anim!” in the briefs submitted to the
Court in Fulton reveals that the petitioners and eight of the petitioners’ amici argued that the
city acted with hostility or animosity towards CSS.
98. A Westlaw search using the term “decent and honorable” reveals that the petitioners
and five of the petitioners’ amici quoted this language in Obergefell to describe CSS’s conscience
and religious sincerity.
99. A Westlaw search using the term “hostil!” or “anim!” in the briefs submitted to the
Court in Fulton reveals that the city respondents, the intervenor-respondents, and seven of the
respondents’ amici denied allegations that the city acted with hostility or animosity towards CSS.
100. See, e.g., Brief for City Respondents at 13, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct.
1868 (2021) (No. 19-123), 2020 WL 4819956 (“The non-discrimination requirement . . . is directed at conduct, not speech.”); Brief for Lee C. Bollinger et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 12 n.4, Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (No. 19-123), 2020 WL 5020362 (“[A] ban on
discrimination has been viewed by the Court as a prohibition on conduct, and not on speech.”).
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Second, the participants in the Fulton controversy advanced competing
interpretations of the relevance of historical challenges to landmark civil
rights laws that offer protection based on race, ethnicity, and sex. For instance,
the parties and their amici disagreed over whether the Court’s prior decision
in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises was analogous to or controlling of the
case. 101 Piggie Park rejected a business owner’s free-exercise challenge to Title
II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 after patrons filed a class action against the
business owner for refusing to serve Black customers based on his religious
beliefs opposing racial integration. 102 In its briefing, CSS stressed that “race
discrimination has a unique history,” 103 and their amici rejected the idea that
the government interests involved in prohibiting race discrimination are of
the same significance as sexual orientation. 104 Conversely, the respondents
and their amici emphasized the similarities between the race and sex discrimination rebuked in past civil rights cases, such as Piggie Park, and the sexual
orientation discrimination at issue in Fulton. 105
Third, similar to what McClain traces in the briefing in Masterpiece
Cakeshop, the participants in Fulton emphasized values of civility, tolerance,
and pluralism but disagreed over what those values require. Over a dozen
briefs filed on behalf of CSS mention the importance of civility, tolerance, or
pluralism with respect to recognizing CSS’s free-exercise claim. 106 On the
101. 390 U.S. 400 (1968). A Westlaw search using the term “Piggie Park” revealed that the
petitioners’ brief, the brief for the intervenor-respondents, and eight of the respondents’ amici
briefs cited to Piggie Park.
102. Piggie Park, 390 U.S. at 402 n.5.
103. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 22, Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (No. 19-123), 2020 WL
5578834.
104. See Brief Amici Curiae of Concerned Women for Am. et al. Supporting Petitioners at
17–19, Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (No. 19-123), 2020 WL 3065263; Brief for Nebraska et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 33–34, Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (No. 19-123), 2020 WL
3078490; Brief of Amici Curiae the Inst. for Faith & Fam. & the Int’l Conf. of Evangelical Chaplain Endorsers in Support of Petitioners at 11, Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (No. 19-123), 2020 WL
3001610.
105. See Brief for Intervenor-Respondents at 45–46, Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (No. 19-123),
2020 WL 4820032; Brief of GLBTQ Legal Advocs. & Defs. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 24, Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (No. 19-123), 2020 WL 5027317; Brief of the Leadership Conf. on Civ. & Hum. Rts. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 20–21, Fulton,
141 S. Ct. 1868 (No. 19-123), 2020 WL 5044629; Brief for Amici Curiae President of the House
of Deputies of the Episcopal Church et al. in Support of Respondents and Affirmance at 31,
Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (No. 19-123), 2020 WL 5076843; Brief of Amici Curiae Scholars of the
Const. Rts. & Ints. of Child. in Support of Respondents at 20–21, Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (No.
19-123), 2020 WL 5027315; Brief Amici Curiae of Miguel H. Díaz et al. in Support of Respondents at 9–13, Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (No. 19-123), 2020 WL 5044725; Brief of Amici Curiae Legal
Scholars in Support of Equal. in Support of Respondents at 28–32, Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (No.
19-123), 2020 WL 4939184; Brief of Amicus Curiae Lawrence G. Sager Supporting Respondents
at 9–10, Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (No. 19-123), 2020 WL 5027321.
106. A Westlaw search using the algorithm (civility OR toleran! OR plural OR pluralism
OR pluralistic) in the briefs submitted to the Court in Fulton, and then searching for those terms
in each of the results, reveals that the reply brief for petitioners and sixteen of petitioners’ amici
briefs referred to terms like civility, tolerance, or pluralism.
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other hand, several of the respondents’ amici reject the notion that enforcing
the city’s public accommodations law threatens these values. If anything, they
argue, it promotes them. 107
These rhetorical strategies reappeared during the oral argument in Fulton. 108 None of the advocates or the justices explicitly used the rhetoric of bigotry. 109 Justice Alito, however, asked pointed questions to the city
respondents’ counsel about whether the city acted with hostility or animosity
towards CSS’s religion. 110 The Solicitor General’s Office, arguing as an amicus
in support of CSS and the other petitioners, referred to CSS’s religious sincerity several times 111 and also invoked Justice Kennedy’s “decent and honorable”
language. 112 CSS’s counsel and the Solicitor General’s Office appealed to values of tolerance and pluralism at multiple points during oral argument. 113
One of the most pronounced issues during oral argument centered on
analogies to interracial marriage and race discrimination more generally. Five
of the justices (Justices Barrett, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan) asked
questions on the topic. 114 The exchanges lend further support to McClain’s
claim that people do not always agree on the lessons of the past when drawing
analogies to old forms of bigotry in order to identify new forms (p. 215). Justice Barrett, for instance, asked CSS’s counsel whether deciding the case in its
favor would mean that faith-based agencies would be entitled to an exemption
if they refused to certify interracial married couples. 115 In response, CSS’s
counsel referred to Loving and distinguished the government’s compelling interest in eradicating racial discrimination from the case at hand. 116
The Solicitor General’s Office made the same argument in response to
Justice Breyer’s question about interracial marriage, emphasizing “how race is
unique in this country’s constitutional history.”117 It also agreed with Justice
Alito’s characterization that the Court in Obergefell said that there were “honorable and respectable” reasons for opposing same-sex marriage and that the

107. A Westlaw search using the algorithm (civility OR toleran! OR plural OR pluralism
OR pluralistic) in the briefs submitted to the Court in Fulton, followed by a search for those
terms in each of the results, reveals that the reply brief for petitioners and sixteen of petitioners’
amici briefs referred to terms like civility, tolerance, or pluralism.
108. Linda McClain, The Fulton v. City of Philadelphia Oral Argument: Interracial Marriage as a Constitutional Lodestar—or Third Rail?—in Reasoning about Religiously-Motivated
Discrimination, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 17, 2020), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2020/11/the-fulton-v-city-of-philadelphia-oral.html [perma.cc/K9Q9-TH4B].
109. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 11.
110. See id. at 68–70.
111. Id. at 34, 40, 44.
112. Id. at 57.
113. Id. at 33, 40, 55, 57 (tolerance); 5–6, 33, 40, 118 (pluralism).
114. Id. at 31 (Justice Barrett); id. at 38–39 (Justice Breyer); id. at 39 (Justice Alito); id. at
42 (Justice Sotomayor); id. at 47–48 (Justice Kagan).
115. Id. at 31.
116. Id. at 31–32.
117. Id. at 39.
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Court “didn’t say . . . and never would have said that” about interracial marriage. 118 Soon after, Justice Sotomayor appeared to challenge the idea that the
government’s compelling interest in eradicating race discrimination is exceptional and could not apply to other protected classes that are vulnerable to
discrimination. 119 The Solicitor General’s Office again responded that the government’s interest in addressing discrimination was different in the sexualorientation context because of CSS’s sincere religious objection to same-sex
marriage. 120
Although these key themes about bigotry were prominent in the briefs
and oral argument, they were not a focus of Chief Justice Roberts’ majority
opinion in Fulton. Deciding the case on narrower terms, the majority concentrated on a provision in the city’s contract with CSS that incorporated a system
of individual exemptions at the “sole discretion” of the Commissioner. 121 According to the majority, this provision rendered the nondiscrimination requirement in the city’s contract with CSS not generally applicable, triggering
strict scrutiny. 122 The majority concluded that the city could not offer a compelling reason why it could deny CSS an exemption while granting it to others,
in violation of the Free Exercise Clause. 123
Key themes about bigotry, however, do appear in Justice Alito’s lengthy
concurrence. 124 In his concurrence, Justice Alito urged a far broader ruling
that would have overruled the Court’s 1990 decision in Employment Division
v. Smith 125 to afford greater protection for religion against government regulation and interference under the Free Exercise Clause. 126 After devoting dozens of pages to explaining why Smith should be overruled, Justice Alito
returned to the facts of Fulton and stressed important themes about bigotry
that were focal points in his questioning during oral argument and remarks at
the Federalist Society’s 2020 convention. 127 Specifically, Justice Alito appealed
to the value of “an open, pluralistic, self-governing society” to stress that the
fact that many would find opposition to same-sex marriage “not only objectionable but hurtful” does not justify curtailing First Amendment rights. 128
Distancing the issues at stake in Fulton from past civil rights challenges, Justice
Alito also emphasized that “lumping those who hold traditional beliefs about

118. Id. at 39–40.
119. Id. at 42.
120. Id. at 44.
121. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1878 (2021).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1882.
124. Id. at 1883 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
125. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
126. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1883.
127. Id. at 1924. Notably, these themes also appeared in Justice Alito’s dissent in Obergefell
v. Hodges. 576 U.S. 644, 736, 741–42 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting).
128. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1924.
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marriage together with racial bigots is insulting to those who retain such beliefs.” 129 In addition, Justice Alito quoted the “decent and honorable” language
in Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Obergefell to underscore that the
Court had committed itself to “refusing to equate traditional beliefs about
marriage . . . with racism.”130
Fulton ultimately left many questions unanswered about the struggle over
marriage and the scope of civil rights, both in the context of LGBTQ child
welfare and antidiscrimination protection for LGBTQ people more broadly.
The arguments in the Fulton case, however, are instructive for legal battles
ahead and illustrate several key points McClain makes about the rhetoric of
bigotry in Who’s the Bigot? As McClain describes, a key lesson that readers
should take away from the four puzzles about bigotry articulated early in the
book is that in conflicts over marriage and the scope of civil rights, the legal
question should focus on whether discrimination exists and causes harm, not
on whether sincere religious beliefs or appeals to conscience deserve moral
condemnation as bigotry (p. 213).
The differences in how the opposing sides in the Fulton controversy
acknowledge LGBTQ foster youth illuminate the high stakes of this key lesson
for LGBTQ child welfare. In the briefing for the CSS petitioners and their
amici, LGBTQ youth are very rarely discussed and are only mentioned when
characterizing the city respondent’s arguments. 131 LGBTQ foster youth, however, are a much greater focal point in the briefing for the city respondents
and their amici. In addition to the city respondent’s brief, almost one-third of
the respondent’s amici’s briefs recognize, and discuss to various degrees, how
granting broad religious exemptions in the child welfare domain stigmatizes
and harms LGBTQ youth. 132 McClain’s important work demonstrates that
framing the legal question in terms of harm rather than relief centers the experiences of LGBTQ foster youth in conflicts over marriage and the scope of
civil rights that directly affect them.
CONCLUSION
McClain’s insightful book builds a persuasive case for why the legal inquiry in struggles over marriage and civil rights should not narrowly focus on
whether religious sincerity or appeals to conscience deserve moral condemnation. The book also provides a convincing account for why rhetoric matters
in civil rights disputes, particularly in polarized times like the current moment. In sum, Who’s the Bigot? makes a meaningful contribution to the literature at the intersection of family law and civil rights.
129. Id. at 1925.
130. Id. (quoting Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 672).
131. For a comprehensive analysis of different ways that ideas involving “harm to children”
are discussed in the Fulton briefs, see Jordan Blair Woods, Framing Harm to Children in the
Debate over Religious Exemptions in Child Welfare: Lessons from Fulton, 60 FAM. CT. REV. 82
(2022).
132. Id.

